tests, which tend to favor men over women. Part Ill notes at least four different standards that have been applied by the courts in the physical ability test context. Part IV proposes a two-prong test that best reflects the command from Congress that any test with a disparate impact be both "job related" and "consistent with business necessity." 4 The Comment then applies the proposed test to the physical ability test context and to disparate impact litigation in general.
I. BACKGROUND A. History of Title VII Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits job discrimination on the basis of race, sex, religion, or national origin. When originally enacted, it was unclear whether Title VII would treat as an "unlawful employment practice" a job requirement or employment test that, while facially neutral, tended to disproportionately exclude women or racial minorities from a particular position. The Supreme Court answered that question in the seminal case of Griggs v Duke Power Co, 7 where the Court concluded that even with no finding of discriminatory intent, an employment test that had a disparate impact on a protected class could violate Title VII. 6 In Griggs, the Court held invalid a requirement that power plant workers who wished to be promoted to coal handling positions either have a high school diploma or pass a standardized intelligence test." The Court found that such a requirement tended to hinder the opportunity for African-Americans to earn promotions, and it based its decision, in part, on an analysis of the workforce of the power plant in question, which showed a wide disparity between the number of white and African-American coal handlers. '° The Court was careful to note that not all tests causing a disparate impact in employment opportunities would violate Title VII.
4
Id. 5 42 USC § 2000e et seq (1994) . 6 The legislative history indicates that most members assumed Title VII would not apply to such disparate impact cases. See Andrew C. Spiropoulos, Defining the Business Necessity Defense to the Disparate Impact Cause of Action: Finding the Golden Mean, 74 NC L Rev 1479,1481 (1996) (noting that Congress may have intended only to hold employers liable for "intentional discrimination"). See also 110 Cong Ree S 7213 (Apr 8, 1964) (interpretive memorandum of Senators Clarke and Case) (declaring that employers need not abandon "bona fide qualification tests" if members of some groups outperformed members of other groups).
However, the Act had "placed on the employer the burden of showing that any given requirement must have a manifest relationship to the employment in question."" In a key passage the Court explained, "The touchstone is business necessity. If an employment practice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related to job performance, the practice is prohibited."' 12 Thus in post-Griggs disparate impact cases, one important issue is determining exactly which tests that create a disparate impact are valid and which violate Title VII. The phrases "business necessity" and "job related" have become critical to this analysis, despite the apparent redundancy of these two terms. After all, in common parlance, if an employment practice is a business necessity, it seemingly must also be job related.
In its subsequent jurisprudence, the Supreme Court clearly held that not all tests creating a disparate impact were necessarily a violation of Title VII. Nevertheless, the Court did little to clarify exactly when an employment test that had a disparate impact was nonetheless a reasonable measure of job performance. The Supreme Court next addressed the issue in Albemarle Paper Co v Moody," where it seemingly adopted a strict standard that would likely render most physical and written tests invalid.' In Albemarle, a paper plant sought to use in making its hiring and promotion decisions a written skills test on which white workers outperformed racial minorities.' 5 In affirming a lower court decision striking down this test, the Court established the burden-shifting analysis that has become critical to all Title VII disparate impact claims. First, the plaintiff must establish that the tests in question select applicants for hire in a "pattern significantly different from that of the pool of applicants.' '1 6 If the plaintiff makes this showing of disparate impact, the burden shifts to the employer to validate that its test is "significantly correlated with important elements of work behavior which comprise or are relevant to the job.' 7 Since the plaintiffs in Albemarle had demonstrated a disparate impact in hiring and the paper plant was unable to point to any correlation between test scores and job success among those who had passed the test, the Court determined that the test was invalid. ' In Dothard v Rawlinson, 9 the Supreme Court for the first (and to date only) time considered the legality of an employment test that had a disparate impact on women.2 This case also seemed to espouse a strict standard, although the evidence there was more conflicting. The plaintiff in Dothard failed to meet a requirement that all Alabama prison guards be at least five-foot two inches and weigh at least 120 pounds.' Such a rule would have screened out a substantial percentage of the female population, but very few men. The state asserted that its rule was justified because prison guards needed to be strong, and taller, heavier people tended to be stronger. However, the defendants failed to introduce any statistical evidence, essentially urging the adoption of a rational basis standard for employer defenses in the disparate impact context. ' The Court declined to embrace such a standard, concluding that once the plaintiff established a prima facie case of disparate impact, the burden shifted to the defendant to produce statistical evidence justifying the need for the test or standard.
2 5 In a footnote frequently cited by those attacking physical tests, the Court implied that employers could use discriminatory testing mechanisms only under very limited circumstances: "[A] discriminatory employment practice must be shown to be necessary to safe and efficient job performance to survive a Title VII challenge." 26 While alluding to this strict standard, the Court also stated that if strength really were a bona fide "job-related quality," it should not be difficult for the state to validate a test that measured strength directly instead of indirectly through reliance on height and weight measurements. 27 17 Id at 431, quoting 29 CFR § 1607.4(c). 18 Albemarle, 422 US at 431-32. The EEOC has issued guidelines detailing the evidence an employer must present for a test to be deemed "validated." See 29 CFR § 1607.5(B) (1999) .
19 433 US 321 (1977) .
20
Id at 331 (finding that height and weight requirements had a disparate impact). 21 Id at 323-24. 22 Id at 329 (noting that the height and weight requirements would exclude 33.29 percent of all women between 18-79 years of age, but only 1.28 percent of all men).
23 Id at 331. 24 Id. See also id at 339-40 (Rehnquist concurring) (discussing appellants' near total lack of evidence).
25 Id at 331 ("If the employer discerns fallacies or deficiencies in the data offered by the plaintif he is free to adduce countervailing evidence of his own.").
26 Id at 331 n 14. 27 Id at 332.
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While implying a strict standard in disparate impact cases, the Supreme Court did uphold two employment requirements that were challenged by African-Americans in the late 1970s.2 In New York City Transit Authority v Beazer2 the Court determined that there was a "manifest relationship" between a rule against hiring methadone users and the need to hire employees who would be "safety sensitive. ' Surprisingly, in light of Dothard, the Court did not assess whether the ban on methadone users was necessary for safe job performance. Indeed, Justice Stevens' majority opinion found that the transit authority's goals of safety and efficiency were "significantly served by-even if they do not require-[the methadone] rule." 3 In Washington v Davisn the Supreme Court upheld a literacy test for police trainees in the face of challenges under the Equal Protection Clause and a District of Columbia anti-discrimination statute. The Court first concluded that a disparate impact cause of action could not be brought under the Equal Protection Clause, which requires a finding of discriminatory intent.m It then went on to affirm the district court's finding in favor of the employer on the statutory claim." 5 In upholding the literacy test, the Court noted that "some minimum verbal and communication skill would be very useful, if not essential, to satisfactory progress" on the job." While the Court's interpretation of the statute at issue is obviously not controlling on Title VII analysis, the Court did assume that the relevant standards were "similar to those obtaining under Title VII" and not "foreclosed by either Griggs or Albemarle."
B. Wards Cove and the Civil Rights Act of 1991
Amidst this muddled precedent, lower courts faced with employment screening practices that created a disparate impact on a protected class adopted a variety of formulations of the "business necessity" or "job related" defense. 39 To resolve these inconsistent interpre- 
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tations, the Supreme Court attempted to retreat from the strict business necessity test enunciated in some of its earlier opinions by setting out a clear pro-employer standard in Wards Cove Packing Co v Atonio. " Q In Wards Cove, minority cannery workers alleged that they were generally given lower paying jobs and restricted in their chances for promotion because of the disparate impact created by the defen-41 dant company's hiring practices. One of the questions presented was, assuming the plaintiff made out a case of disparate impact, which party had the "burden to prove that any disparate impact caused by [the defendant's] hiring and employment practices was justified by business necessity. 42 The lower court had found that the burden of proving that a discriminatory test was justified should be placed on the defendant. 43 The Supreme Court, while acknowledging that its precedent could be read either way on the matter,44 reversed, holding that the burden of proof should be placed on the plaintiff alleging the discrimination, and not the employer. 45 The primary holding of Wards Cove was this shifting of the burden of proof on the business necessity defense. But the Court attempted to do more than merely shift the procedural burden of proof; it also sought to lay out the substantive elements of the defense itself. Once a plaintiff had demonstrated that an employment practice created a disparate impact, "the dispositive issue is whether a challenged practice serves, in a significant way, the legitimate employment goals of the employer." '' This standard itself could be seen as vastly more pro-employer than the Dothard requirement that a challenged practice be necessary for safe and efficient job performance, and more in line with the deferential stindard of Beazer. for government agencies forced to decide between hundreds of applicants in cases where the use of subjective criteria or educational and literacy requirements often lead to disparate impact challenges from racial minorities.
At least twelve published cases have appeared over the last twenty years evaluating claims asserted by females seeking to invalidate physical ability tests." These decisions have diverged widely, splitting almost in half on findings of liability and delineating numerous standards for applying the business necessity defense. The lack of clarity in the area makes it harder both for employers to design valid tests and for applicants to successfully press claims of genuine gender discrimination. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 rejected the clear proemployer stance of Wards Cove, but, in returning the law to that of Griggs and its progeny, Congress left a muddled standard that courts have struggled to apply.
III. STANDARDS FOR ANALYZING PHYSICAL ABILITY TESTS UNDER TITLE VII
Because the Supreme Court precedent is so confusing and the terms "business necessity" and "job related" are seemingly redundant, lower courts have struggled to articulate a rule for analyzing physical test cases. Essentially, four major standards have developed. From most to least deferential to employers they are: manifest relationship, the Spurlock public safety doctrine, close approximation, and minimum qualifications. Because these approaches include standards that show great deference to employer tests and those that would ban virtually any physical test used as a prerequisite for employment, they can yield substantially different results when applied to similar physical tests.
A. Manifest Relationship
The most lenient standard merely requires the defendant employer to prove a manifest relationship between the physical examination and successful job performance." This standard is based on the contention in Griggs that an employer must show "that any given requirement [has] a manifest relationship to the employment in question." '' Thus, if the employer demonstrates a legitimate business purpose and shows that the test implemented will effectively carry out that business purpose, the test will survive chalenge. The manifest relationship standard was used in Eison v City of Knoxville, where a female police trainee challenged a requirement that all recruits be able to pass a battery of tests including "sit-ups, push-ups, leg lifts, squat thrusts, pull-ups, and a two mile run." ' While the court did require the defendant police department to establish that the test was "job related,"' ' this meant only that the score used as a cutoff was not arbitrary but seemed in some way rational, not that there was any specific correlation between test success and job success. 70 Thus, in Eison, the court found that a police department could rationally conclude that attributes such as upper and lower body strength and endurance were important to the job, and that these attributes could be measured through the battery of tests established.7 This rendered the test valid despite the fact that men outperformed women.7
While the manifest relationship standard is quite flexible, it would not permit every physical test to survive scrutiny. Plaintiffs could prevail by demonstrating a viable alternative for measuring the skills sought (strength and endurance) that would not have a disparate impact, but there, of course, the burden would be on the plaintiff. 7' Also, a physical test designed through an "intuitive process" with no validation whatsoever will not be sustained, and validation after the fact will not suffice. 74 While the selected cutoff scores supposedly designed to measure strength and stamina cannot be arbitrary, any test that measures those skills could be upheld if properly validated. 5 
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Id ("All proof showed that the exercises were related to physical traits deemed necessary in police officers."). 72 The court separately noted that under EEOC Guidelines, the plaintiff could only make out a prima facie case of disparate impact if her police academy class alone was considered the relevant group of applicants. Id. Thus, some courts have rationalized that employers should face a lighter burden in proving a "business necessity" when public safety is a concern related to the job position. Some commentators believe a dual standard makes better sense of such Supreme Court precedents as Beazer and Washington that upheld screening mechanisms from disparate impact challenges in safety-sensitive positions.7 ' Where the employment test seems calculated to take into account those safety concerns, as most physical tests would, the test will be upheld. 79 These
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See Griggs,401 US at 432 ("Congress has placed on the employer the burden of showing that any given requirement must have a manifest relationship to the employment in question."); Washington, 426 US at 250 (upholding literacy test that measured skills "useful, if not essential to satisfactory progress" on the job); Beazer, 440 US at 587 n 31 (finding "manifest relationship" between ban on methadone use and the need for "safety sensitive" employees). 
78
See Spiropoulos, 74 NC L Rev at 1479 (cited in note 6) (arguing for a two-tiered treatment of the employer disparate impact defense based in part on public safety concerns).
79
A test might still be struck down if it is based on subjective criteria that do not seem to present a manifest relationship to the safety concern presented. See Banks v City of Albany, 953 F Supp 28,36 (N D NY 1997) (denying summary judgment where fire department test was based on subjective criteria). Objective tests, like physical ability tests, would usually survive challenge, public safety concerns will generally involve positions that have a great deal of contact with and impact upon the public. For example, the first case to create this bifurcated standard, Spurlock v United Airlines, Inc," involved a requirement that applicants for a pilot position with a major commercial airline log at least five hundred flight hours. 8' While this requirement had a profoundly disparate impact on minoritiesn and the defendant produced no evidence that pilots with fewer than five hundred hours committed more in-flight errors, the court still held that United Airlines had demonstrated business necessity and that the requirement was job related.n The Tenth Circuit explained that where incalculable "economic and human risks [would be] involved in hiring an unqualified applicant ... , the employer bears a correspondingly lighter burden" than in cases involving unskilled applicants and no public safety concerns. ' Many of the cases that imply a public safety exception to the strict business necessity defense have involved either public transportation, as in Spurlock and Beazer, or police departments, as in Washington. Fire departments, where many physical tests are also used, would seem to implicate similar issues of public safety and economic and human risk." For these reasons, courts evaluating business necessity defenses in the physical test context have occasionally invoked Spurlock and lightened the burden on the employer to justify the need for its test.6
While such a standard might make sense of Supreme Court precedent, the vast majority of these cases were decided prior to the Civil Rights Act of 1991. A two-tiered standard might be "consistent with" Supreme Court cases prior to Wards Cove, but there is nothing in the text of the Act to suggest that the phrase "business necessity"
should involve an entirely different standard in a public safety context however.
80 475 F2d 216 (10th Cir 1972). 81 Id at 219. 82 Only nine of the airline's 5,900 flight officers were African-American. Id at 218. 83 Id at 220. Applicants with more than five hundred flight hours were significantly more likely "to succeed in the rigorous training program which United flight officers go through," the components of which were not specified. Id at 218. Still nearly 90 percent of applicants with fewer hours did complete the program, and there was no evidence in the record of their on-thejob performance. Id at 219 & n 1. 84 Id at 219. 86 For jobs requiring minimal skill or human risk, the Spurlock court would require the employer to bear "a heavy burden to demonstrate ... that his employment criteria are jobrelated." 475 F2d at 219. While the exact contours are not specified, at least one commentator has attempted to flesh out a "strict necessity" standard for non-complex jobs. See Spiropoulos, 74 NC L Rev at 1540-46 (cited in note 6).
than it does in other situations, and the doctrine has never been endorsed explicitly by the Supreme Court." On the other hand, dicta in the Court's decisions upholding a literacy test for police officers in Washington and a rule against methadone use among transit employees in Beazer does lend some support to the idea that the Court implicitly accepted a two-tiered standard." For these reasons, the Spurlock doctrine remains controversial.
C. Close Approximation to Job Tasks
A third standard used by several courts in analyzing physical ability tests focuses on the nature of the test selected by the defendant employer. When a physical test closely approximates a task the candidate would actually perform on the job, it is likely to be upheld.8 For example, the court in Hardy v Stumpf was faced with a disparate impact challenge to an Oakland police department requirement that each applicant scale a six-foot wall. 9' Because the test "reflect[ed] a critical duty of Oakland police officers," it closely approximated a job task and was determined to be valid.2
However, if the test were more of a general fitness exam or an obstacle course, the court would closely scrutinize the test's disparate impact and impose a much higher burden on a department implementing the test. 93 Thus, while the manifest relationship standard and the Spurlock doctrine focus on the skill being tested, the close approximation standard looks primarily at the form of the test itself. The argument in support of this approach appears to be that the best way to determine if a test is consistent with business necessity is if the employee would actually be performing the tasks set out for her in the physical test in the course of her job. upheld a requirement that a police officer scale a six foot wall, or run 1.5 miles in 12 minutes because these are "critical duties" performed in the course of a job.' And the New York City Fire Department could implement a test including a hose pull and wall vault that simulated engine and ladder company tasks. 9 On the other hand, a general skills test including a pike pole pull, sandbag drag, and stair climb, was invalid because it did "not represent the physical demands of the job." 9 Under the close approximation standard, a general battery of physical tests like that approved in Eison would presumably be found invalid since it does not measure any actual job tasks.9
Courts that require a physical test to closely approximate actual job tasks tend to focus on language in Albemarle and Dothard that opposed tests failing to meet this standard. The Court in Dothard found the height and weight requirements suspect because of a lack of correlation between the skill desired by the Alabama prisons department (strength) and what was actually being measured (weight)." If a test closely replicates an actual job task, such as a hose pull or a wall climb, and the employer can demonstrate a rational need for having the employee perform that task, courts are less suspicious that the test is masking invidious discrimination or inadvertently screening out qualified applicants.
The close approximation standard is often tied to the concept of "content validity." The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") has developed guidelines for validating employment tests. One of these measures, content validity, is established by "data showing that the content of a selection procedure is representative of important aspects of performance on the job."" Although the guidelines do not carry the force of legislative enactments, courts have granted them deference.n This is especially true in light of the Supreme For these reasons, courts have been more sympathetic to a test replicating job conditions than a mere "fitness test" because the former measures the component skills that are important to the job. While courts using this standard generally inquire solely into the relation between the test and the skill being measured, they may still reject the selection of an arbitrary cutoff score that has no rational relation to the needs of the job,ln or that has been positively demonstrated to be unnecessarily high.'°3
D. Minimum Qualifications
The strictest standard to date was recently announced by the
Third Circuit in Lanning v Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation
Authority. 1 4 At issue was a requirement that all applicants for police officer positions assigned to the transit authority for the greater Philadelphia metropolitan area ("SEPTA") successfully run 1.5 miles in under twelve minutes. ' The test had been designed by a fitness consultant in response to high crime rates within the transit system and several incidents in which out-of-shape officers were injured or arrived late to crime scenes.'0 Police officers for the transit authority usually worked alone, patrolled on foot, and were expected at times to pursue suspects. ' O ' The test was designed to measure a specific aerobic capacity that the fitness consultant and transit authority determined would be necessary for police officers to have a good chance of apprehending the average criminal. ' When the test was implemented, a total of 55.6 percent of men were able to pass the test, but only 6.7 percent of women ran the 1.5 (finding that fact that employment test was validated in accordance with Guidelines coupled with other evidence was sufficient to uphold the test); Brunet, 642 F Supp at 1227 ("Although not binding on this court, the Uniform Guidelines are entitled to substantial deference.").
101 See Albemarle, 422 US at 431, quoting 29 CFR § 1607.4(C) (requiring employer to show a written skills test was "significantly correlated with important elements of work behavior"). miles successfuly.'° The transit authority conceded that the distinction in percentage passage rates was enough to create a prima facie case of disparate impact."" Under the Civil Rights Act of 1991, the burden of proving that the test was a business necessity then shifted to the defendants. ' The district court, relying on the close approximation to job tasks test, held that the defendant had proved that the test was a business necessity.' 1 2 It accepted the testimony of the fitness consultant regarding the need for physically fit transit police officers, and the ability of the test to measure that skill. Accordingly, the court granted summary judgment for the defendant. '13 The Third Circuit reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case for further discovery 1 14 The court emphasized the most stringent language appearing in the Supreme Court's Title VII jurisprudence. 5 The primary justification for this emphasis was the fact that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 was a direct response to Wards Cove, which had articulated an easier standard for employers to meet. 116 Consequently, the court found that Congress wished to eliminate employment requirements with a disparate impact except in very narrow circumstances and determined that a strict standard was needed to accomplish this aim: "[A] discriminatory cutoff score is impermissible unless shown to measure the minimum qualifications necessary for successful performance of the job in question., 1 1 7 While acknowledging the strictness of this standard, the court did not believe it would require the implementation of quota systems or the hiring of unqualified applicants. Instead, the court articulated three non-quota 109 Id at 483. ' 20 Third, SEPTA could utilize two different cutoff scores-one for men and an easier one for women.u ' Because the district court utilized a different standard, the case had to be remanded for evaluation of the 1.5 mile run under the test laid down by the Third Circuit.n Dissenting, Judge Weis argued that a close examination of the Supreme Court's Title VII jurisprudence before Wards Cove showed great deference to employer decisions when public safety was implicated.w He feared that the majority's new minimum qualifications test would lead to the abandonment of all physical tests and concluded that the overriding consideration in these cases was the issue of public safety endorsed in the Spurlock doctrine. 4 Since public safety concerns are implicated in police department hiring decisions, Judge Weis would have granted summary judgment to SEPTA if it could demonstrate a manifest relationship between its test and the job requirements, a standard more pro-employer even than that used by the district court.2
The debate between the majority and the dissent in Lanning is only another example of the difficulties courts face when evaluating the use of physical fitness tests as a cutoff for employment purposes. Because the Supreme Court has yet to interpret this portion of the 1991 Civil Rights Act, courts must struggle to resolve these confused standards on their own. US at 432; Beazer, 440 US at 587 n 31 (allowing a test that "significantly served" the goals of safety and efficiency, even if the test was not required for those goals to be served).
124 See Lanning, 181 F3d at 502 (Weis dissenting).
IV. A PROPOSED RESOLUTION
In evaluating the business necessity defense after 1991, it is crucial to scrutinize the text of the statute Congress enacted. While canons of statutory construction counsel interpretation of statutes in light of the prevailing common law, any such interpretation must still make sense of the current statutory text.' That text contains two requirements: the test must be "job related" and it must be "consistent with business necessity. ' ' While most courts essentially adopt a single standard to conflate both of these terms, it is possible, and indeed makes sense, to treat them as two separate requirements, both of which must be met for an employer to successfully defend the validity of its test.
The best way to make sense of the statutory text and case law would be to create a two-prong test for assessing physical ability tests and other employment screens that create a disparate impact, one addressing the "job related" requirement and the other assessing the "business necessity" component. It should be possible for an employment test to be struck down under either component without automatically implicating the other. At the same time, it should be possible for employers to muster proof that a given test satisfies both prongs and thereby persuade a court that the test should be sustained in spite of its disparate impact.
A. The Two-Prong Test 1. The skill sought to be measured by the employment test is consistent with business necessity.
A two-prong test also makes sense because most cases evaluating employment tests emphasize one of two separate concerns. The first is whether the skill being measured (for example, speed, stamina, strength, intelligence) by the employment test is actually a prerequisite for the job in question. This concern reflects whether or not the test is "consistent with business necessity" by measuring a skill necessary for job performance. In order to meet the demands of this first prong, an employer would need to identify the skill or ability the employment test measures, and prove to the district court's satisfaction a "manifest relationship" between the skill tested and the job itself; evidence similar to that amassed in Eison. In the context of physical ability tests, most employers would be able to pass this prong since it is similar to the manifest relationship standard outlined in Eison and related cases and could be satisfied through the production of similar evidence of a job's physical demands. Physical skills such as strength, speed, and endurance are generally rationally related to police and fire department positions.2 Of course, physical tests might not be manifestly related to a private sector job, or a position as a police dispatcher. And some tests would fail to satisfy even the manifest relationship standard. ' "
The first prong makes sense because often the first issue that has confronted courts in employment discrimination cases is whether the skill tested is actually necessary for the job. Thus, the defendant in Griggs offered no evidence whatsoever that literacy or basic math skills, which might possibly be measured by the receipt of a high school diploma, were necessary for the position of a coal handler at a power plant.n Literacy was also not shown in Albemarle to be a prerequisite for employment as a low-level worker at a paper mill.'3 On the other hand, the methadone rule in Beazer did significantly serve the goal of a safe and accident-free transit authority. The Court's primary concern in these cases seemed to be that employers were actually using these neutral criteria not to screen out unqualified applicants but to conceal disparate treatment of protected minorities. Meeting the first prong by proving the business necessity of the skill in question would serve to rebut such fears.
The test itself is clearly job related by closely approximating
an on-the-job task.
The first prong is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for a successful business necessity defense. Equally important is the requirement that the test selected by the employer accurately gauge that skill. Thus, if a given skill is found to be a "business necessity" for a job, then a test that precisely measures that skill is "related" to the job. 
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skill a "business necessity" under the first prong of the proposed test. However, the Court required that any test must correlate to "the requisite amount of strength thought essential to good job performance. ' A simple height requirement at best indirectly correlates with strength, as short individuals may in many instances be stronger than those who are taller. A direct measurement is likely to be most successful if it measures the actual content of the job itself. This "content validation" is one of the three mechanisms that the EEOC suggests can be used to validate an employment test, and it is best used for skills that are easily measurable (as opposed to abstract thinking skills or leadership). 4 Since physical strength and stamina are concrete skills, it should not be unduly burdensome for an employer to devise tests that closely approximate job tasks."' Thus, in the physical ability test arena, "job relatedness" is likely to become synonymous with the language "closely approximates a job task" found in numerous opinions over the years."" In addition, an employer would probably have to show that the cutoff score is also rationally calibrated to approximate necessary on-the-job skills, although that score need not be the absolute minimum required for job performance. '3' To summarize, the best interpretation of the business necessity defense to a disparate impact claim codified in the Civil Rights Act of 1991 would uphold the test only when the employer produces evidence that its test closely approximates and effectively measures ("job related") a skill that is important to successful job performance ("consistent with business necessity"). An important canon of construction requires courts to give meaning to the entire statutory text if possible." If there are two possible readings of a statute, one of which "renders some words altogether redundant," the other reading should be preferred. ' It is presumed that Congress knows what it is doing in enacting statutory text and does not include words that are unnecessary for understanding the statute. ' 4
The best interpretation of the business necessity defense under the standard would be one that gives meaning both to the phrase "job related" and to the phrase "consistent with business necessity." Indeed, at least one court favoring a strict standard has argued that the manifest relationship standard violates this principle by requiring only that the physical ability test be related to the job in question without evaluating the business necessity of the practice. At the same time, it could equally be argued that a stringent minimum qualifications test creates the same problem by writing out the job relatedness standard at the expense of the business necessity language. If "consistent with business necessity" defines a test that measures the minimum qualifications necessary for successful job performance, it seems impossible to conceive of a test that would meet such a standard and yet not be job related. In that case, the "job relatedness" prong of the business necessity defense would become irrelevant.
The two-prong test is more consistent with statutory text than the options currently outlined by courts because it recognizes the inherent difficulty in applying a single standard to cover the two separate terms "job related" and "consistent with business necessity." By bifurcating these terms, focusing the attention of one on the job relatedness of the employment test itself and the other on the business necessity of the 141 See Lanning, 181 F3d at 489 ("Judicial application of a standard focusing solely on whether the qualities measured by an entry level exam bear some relationship to the job in question would impermissibly write out the business necessity prong of the Act's chosen standard.").
skill being tested, each can be given statutory meaning without causing "job related" to be swallowed up or "consistent with business necessity" to be ignored.
In addition, it is crucial to note that the Civil Rights Act requires only that an employment practice be consistent with business necessity. 2 Implementing a standard like the minimum qualifications test requires the test to, in essence, be a business necessity, writing the word "consistent" out of the statute. Thus, in evaluating whether a test is consistent with business necessity, the focus must lie not on the test itself, as it is under the minimum qualifications standard, but on the skills being measured by the test. If those skills are consistent with the needs of a safe and efficient business, the test is valid. ' At the same time, the proposed two-prong test clearly goes farther than either the manifest relationship standard or the Spurlock doctrine. The Spurlock exception, while containing many valid concerns about public safety, is not supported by the text of the statute; there is simply no distinction made on the statute's face between publie and private employers or between jobs that do and do not impact public safety.' While many of these safety concerns can still be evaluated when assessing the skills necessary for job performance, 45 they should not be taken into account as independent considerations.'" 2. Consistent with Supreme Court precedent.
The interpretive memorandum accompanying the Civil Rights Act of 1991 explicitly requires that the Act be applied consistent with Supreme Court decisions predating Wards Cove.'4 Therefore, no interpretation of Title VII's current statutory language is acceptable if it does not reflect the meaning of the terms "business necessity" and "job related" as they were articulated in those precedents.'" Any test must, at a minimum, both correctly incorporate the five major Su-
143 See Beazer, 440 US at 587 & n 31 (upholding rule banning methadone users from employment in "safety sensitive" positions). Just as the skill or qualification in Beazer was safe job performance, so in physical tests the skill of strength or stamina should be judged based on the needs of the police or fire department in question.
144 preme Court Title VII precedents 9 and harmonize their reasoning. The two-prong test does this by recognizing that Griggs and its progeny were actually focused on two different problems in their language and rhetoric: the problem of employers testing skills that are unnecessary for job performance (i.e., business necessity) and the problem of tests that incorrectly measure necessary skills (i.e., job relatedness). Thus, when the Court notes that "[t]he touchstone is business necessity"" ' , and that a practice must be necessary for safe and efficient performance,' 5 it is mainly focusing on the skills being tested: literacy among coal handlers or strength among prison guards. ' 5 But when the court seeks a "demonstrably ... reasonable measure of job performance,"' 5 3 it is questioning whether the test itself is a close approximation or an adequate measure for that skill.
3. Consistent with purposes of Title VII.
The primary goal of Title VII was to prevent discriminatory hiring practices. While there is much debate over the exact scope and purpose of disparate impact analysis, 55 at a minimum, disparate impact analysis should halt practices that appear likely to mask discriminatory treatment or that do not produce any countervailing benefits to the employer.f An employment test that fails to measure accurately a job's requirements and that creates a disparate impact provides an employer with no legitimate benefits or efficiencies and harms society by reducing job opportunities for females or minorities. If the courts can successfully identify such cases, they should act to rectify the problem.
In the context of physical ability tests, the two-prong test does a good job of addressing the purposes of Title VII on two fronts. First, it is unlikely that an employer could select a physical test with discriminatory intent that would both achieve its aims and survive judicial scrutiny. An employer could not simply choose to test skills at which 156 See Spiropoulos, 74 NC L Rev at 1528-29 (cited in note 6) (arguing that Title VII was intended to balance employer needs while preventing discrimination). men excel if those skills are not a business necessity.L7 Alternatively, the employer could not create a test slanted to benefit males. If the employer created a test that did not accurately measure a skill necessary for job performance, that test would be struck down as not job related. And if an attempt were made to manipulate cutoff scores to avoid hiring female employees, the test again would be invalid under the job relatedness prong because the placement of the cutoff score would not be rationally related to the skill being tested."
Even if disparate impact analysis is also thought necessary to prevent hidden, subconscious stereotypes from unfairly discriminating against women, the two-prong test will still likely remedy the problem. Since the employer must in any event demonstrate content validity as to an employment test's make-up, any test implemented without forethought will have virtually no chance of viability.
Second, this test is likely to reduce error costs since it both clarifies and limits the inquiry courts must make.'° A disparate impact inquiry can create error costs in either of two directions. Courts might underenforce the statute, permitting discriminatory practices and reducing confidence in public agencies.'' On the other hand, courts might overenforce the statute, leading to costly validation procedures or the selection of unqualified applicants, which, in turn, would reduce the effectiveness of law enforcement or fire protection.
The two-prong test balances these concerns by requiring judges to seek answers to questions they are likely to resolve correctly. It may be difficult for a court to determine, based on competing statistical displays, whether a police officer must run a mile in eight minutes, ten minutes, or fifteen minutes in order to successfully perform her job, as would be required under the minimum qualifications test. It should be much less difficult for a court to determine (a) that endurance is (or is not) a critical aspect of employment as a police officer and (b) that a 1.5 mile test does (or does not) approximate job conditions the aver- age police officer must endure.' 2 The two-prong test is thus not only consistent with the statutory mandate and Supreme Court precedent, but also with easy implementation and prevailing notions of judicial competence.
4. Unlikely to compromise public safety.
While the proposed test does not endorse the Spurlock doctrine's emphasis on public safety and efficiency, it does essentially incorporate safety and efficiency concerns through the "business necessity" prong of the employer defense. For example, a police department would still be allowed to implement a running requirement clearly motivated by concerns about criminals eluding pursuit and embarrassing media attention. ' In effect, the test does grant some deference to employers in seeking to justify their employment practices if they are testing skills that will create the safest and most efficient police and fire departments. Under the proposed two-prong test, most of the cases discussed in Part IH of this Comment would still be decided in the same way. For example, the Hardy court would merely determine under the first prong that strength and climbing skills were necessary for the job of an Oakland police officer and then recognize, as it did, that a test requiring climbing a six-foot wall is job related because it closely approximates those tasks. In a few cases, however, this refined analysis would yield different results. The court in Eison, for example, would recognize that while physical fitness was a "business necessity" for a police officer, measuring that skill through push-ups, sit-ups, and an obstacle course that do not closely approximate actual job tasks creates a test not sufficiently job related to withstand Title VII scrutiny. A case like Lanning might also be decided differently under the twoprong test. While the court there required that the test itself be a business necessity, the two-prong test would probably deem endurance running to be a skill necessary for successful job performance. Based 162 To sustain such a test, a court could rely either on internal department records that such runs occurred on the job or testimony from experts conducting a job analysis that such a run would simulate actual job conditions. See 29 CFR § 1607.14(C)(2) (1999) (describing technical components and standards of a job analysis).
163 Indeed, Lanning appears to be one of the few physical test cases where clear evidence indicated the test was not established for any discriminatory purpose. Compare Legault v Zambarano, 105 F3d 24,26-28 (1st Cir 1997) (affirming Rule 11 and discovery sanctions against attorneys and defendants for concealing that invalidated physical test was a "mirage").
on the validation tests entered into evidence by SEPTA, a court would likely conclude that a 1.5 mile run closely approximates such actual job tasks as officer backups and running assists and that the twelve minute cutoff time was not selected arbitrarily.'&, The proposed test improves upon the minimum qualifications test by recognizing that it is only the skill tested that must be "consistent with business necessity" while the testing mechanism selected must be "job related." 2. Outside the physical test context. Finally, while the focus of this Comment has been on establishing a business necessity test and its ramifications in the context of employer physical ability tests, the two-prong test proposed here could easily be applied to all Title VII disparate impact claims. Most other challenged employment screens are either general qualifications requirements or written tests. In either of these cases, the basic analysis would begin by questioning whether the skill the employer claimed to be testing was one that would be necessary for safe and efficient job performance.
At the second stage, the court would then inquire whether the test itself was "job related" in that it accurately measured the skill desired. The inquiry might be slightly different in the physical and nonphysical contexts, but, in either case, the EEOC guidelines could provide guidance for test validation.'65 In many cases, the question would be identical to that found in the physical ability context: Does the test closely approximate an actual job task? If so, the test will survive judicial scrutiny. Even if it did not, some higher-order thinking tests might still be upheld through construct or criterion validation.'6 The principles behind the two-prong test, however, would remain the same.
CONCLUSION
The courts and Congress alike have struggled with Supreme Court precedent formulating the business necessity defense because of the frequent failure to differentiate between the two different strands of analysis that have gone into that defense: business necessity and job relatedness. Courts should utilize a test that accounts for both of these strands. When an employer defends a physical test that has a disparate impact on a protected class, the employer should be required to demonstrate both that it is attempting to test a skill consistent with its business necessity and that it has selected a test that closely approximates actual job-related tasks.
